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Abstract 
Evolutionary theory coheres with its neighboring theories, such as the theory of plate 
tectonics, molecular biology, electromagnetic theory, and the germ theory of disease. These 
neighboring theories were previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and then 
they cohered with evolutionary theory. Since evolutionary theory has been strengthened by its 
several neighboring theories that were previously unconceived, it will be strengthened by 
infinitely many hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. This argument for evolutionary 
theory echoes the problem of unconceived alternatives. Ironically, however, the former 
recommends that we take the realist attitude toward evolutionary theory, and the latter 
recommends that we take the antirealist attitude toward it. 
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1. Introduction 
Evolutionary theory receives support from its neighboring theories, such as the theory of 
plate tectonics, molecular biology, electromagnetic theory, and the germ theory of disease. 
These neighboring theories were previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and 
then they supported evolutionary theory. From this observation, I construct what I call the 
argument from neighboring theories, according to which because evolutionary theory has 
been supported by its several neighboring theories that were previously unconceived, it will 
be supported by infinitely many hitherto unconceived neighboring theories.  
In Section 2, I expound upon P. Kyle Stanford’s (2006) problem of unconceived 
alternatives (PUA), which asserts that there are infinitely many hitherto unconceived 
alternatives to current theories. In Section 3, I specify how evolutionary theory receives 
support from its neighboring theories mentioned above. In Section 4, I spell out the argument 
from neighboring theories. In Section 5, I reply to eight objections most of which are raised 
by the reviewers of this journal. It will become clear that the argument from neighboring 
theories is stronger than the PUA, and that it is different from Hilary Putnam’s (1975) no-
miracles argument, the most famous argument for scientific realism. 
This paper should be of interest to those who want to know how current theories differ 
from obsolete theories, whether the former will follow the unfortunate fate of the latter, and 
whether there are arguments other than the no-miracles argument that are intended to 
establish scientific realism.  
 
2. The PUA 
The argument from neighboring theories parallels Stanford’s (2006) PUA. So I explicate the 
PUA in this section. 
The PUA holds that earlier scientists could not entertain current theories that displaced 
past theories, but later scientists entertained current theories, so current scientists cannot 
ideate future alternatives that will displace current theories, but future scientists will ideate 
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future alternatives. For example, caloric theorists could not conceive of the kinetic theory, but 
later scientists conceived of the kinetic theory, so kinetic theorists cannot conceive of a future 
theory that will displace the kinetic theory, but future scientists will conceive of the future 
theory. On this account, scientific theories are fated to be rejected. In order to support the 
PUA, Stanford offers the following list of theory transitions: 
 
Stanford’s List 
from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl’s phlogiston theory to Lavoisier’s 
oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary chemistry 
 
from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology 
 
from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories 
 
from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and 
contemporary electromagnetism 
 
from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease 
 
from eighteenth century corpuscular theories of light to nineteenth century wave theories to the 
contemporary quantum mechanical conception 
 
from Darwin’s pangenesis theory of inheritance to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory to 
Mendelian and then contemporary molecular genetics 
 
from Cuvier’s theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species and 
from Lamarck’s autogenesis to Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Stanford, 2006: 19–20) 
 
On the basis of this list, Stanford concludes that the possibility space of successive 
alternatives “appears to be indeterminate and unbounded” (2006: 133). Each item on the list 
is composed of, at most, several theories. For example, the fifth item on the list is comprised 
of the three theories of disease. These three theories, according to Stanford, provide an 
inductive rationale for the conclusion that there are an infinite number of theories of disease. 
Current scientists cannot conceive of them, but they exist. The fact that current scientists 
cannot entertain them only shows that they are cognitively analogous to earlier scientists 
“whose cognitive constitutions are not well suited to the task of exhausting the kinds of 
spaces of serious candidate theoretical explanations from which our scientific theories are 
drawn” (Stanford, 2006: 45). In short, according to Stanford, even a series of several 
successive theories in a domain amounts to an inductive rationale for the conclusion that 
there are infinitely many successive theories in that domain. 
 
3. Evolutionary Theory and Its Neighboring Theories 
Suppose that T1 and T2 are theories in neighboring fields of science, and that each explains its 
own phenomena. If T1 and T2 are conjoined, they may explain or predict new phenomena, 
i.e., they may yield new observational consequences that agree with the world (Psillos, 1999: 
205). This section aims to show that evolutionary theory, in conjunction with its several 
neighboring theories, explains or predicts diverse new phenomena. 
Evolutionary theory, in conjunction with the theory of plate tectonics, predicted that 
there are fossils of marsupials in Antarctica. According to evolutionary theory, marsupials 
flourished in South America hundreds of millions of years ago. According to the theory of 
plate tectonics, Australia, South America, and Antarctica were once connected with each 
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other and then gradually drifted apart. On the basis of these assumptions, scientists 
(Woodburne and Zinsmeister, 1982) retrodicted that marsupials migrated from South America 
to Australia via Antarctica and predicted that there are fossils of marsupials in Antarctica. 
This prediction, which was confirmed, was made possible by the cooperation of evolutionary 
theory with the theory of plate tectonics. 
Evolutionary theory, together with molecular biology, explains why some people are 
affected by Huntington’s disease, a genetic disease that disrupts nerve cells and ultimately 
leads to death. The Huntington’s Disease Collaborative Research Group (1993) identified the 
gene responsible for the disease. It is mysterious why this gene still exists. Given that it 
causes a deadly disease, natural selection should have weeded it out of our gene pool. 
According to evolutionary theory and molecular biology, the gene has escaped natural 
selection by not affecting people until after they have reproduced, thus sneaking into 
successive generations and thereby causing Huntington’s disease in some people today. Note 
that concepts from both evolutionary theory and molecular biology are employed to explain 
why Huntington’s disease afflicts some people today. 
Evolutionary theory and electromagnetic theory jointly explain why different people 
have different skin pigmentations. According to these two theories, when hominins, our 
distant ancestors, lived in Africa, natural selection favored darkly pigmented individuals. 
Ultraviolet rays destroyed folate in the cutaneous blood vessels of lightly pigmented 
individuals but not darkly pigmented individuals. A high level of folate during pregnancy was 
crucial for having healthy babies. Some hominins began to migrate to other continents about 
1.9 million years ago. Near the poles, natural selection favored lightly pigmented individuals. 
Ultraviolet rays generated vitamin D in the skins of lightly pigmented individuals but not in 
the skins of darkly pigmented individuals. Vitamin D was crucial for maintaining health. In 
between the equator and the poles, natural selection favored those who were capable of 
tanning during the season when ultraviolet light was intense (Jablonski and Chaplin, 2010). 
Together, evolutionary theory, the germ theory, and molecular biology explain why 
some bacteria become resistant to antibiotics. According to these theories, some bacteria 
evolve much faster than other organisms due to their short lifespans, large populations, and 
horizontal gene transfer, which is the gene transfer between organisms of the same generation 
(Soucy, Huang & Gogarten, 2015). It contrasts with vertical gene transfer, which is the gene 
transfer from one generation to the next generation. Horizontal gene transfer is followed by 
genetic mutations, which, in turn, facilitate the advent of new bacteria resistant to old 
antibiotics. Note that notions from evolutionary biology, the germ theory, and molecular 
biology are used to explain why new bacteria survive old antibiotics. Such a rich explanation 
might better yield a clue as to how to control bacteria. 
So far, I have shown that evolutionary theory explains diverse new phenomena in 
conjunction with its neighboring theories. Those neighboring theories are not isolated from 
one another. In what follows, I show that they themselves also jointly explain new 
phenomena. Let me begin with electromagnetic theory and the theory of plate tectonics.  
These two theories jointly explain the symmetrical magnetic stripes on ocean floors 
(Trefil and Hazen, 1998: 403–405). According to electromagnetic theory, Earth’s magnetic 
field flips back and forth every few million years. According to the theory of plate tectonics, 
an ocean basin spreads due to the convection of the mantle. The magnetic stripes are 
explained as follows. The magma that erupted at a mid-ocean ridge contained magnetic 
minerals, which aligned themselves parallel to Earth’s magnetic field while the lava was hot. 
Once the lava hardened, the minerals became immobile. Earth’s magnetic field flipped 
around, as magma continuously erupted at the mid-ocean ridge. Magnetic minerals in the new 
lava aligned themselves in the opposite directions, forming new magnetic stripes as the lava 
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hardened. Many symmetrical magnetic stripes were thus created as a result of the repeated 
magnetic reversals and the spreading of the sea floor. 
The theory of plate tectonics and molecular biology jointly explain the distribution of 
certain organisms. For example, freshwater gastropods are found in Southeast Asia and 
southern India. According to the theory of plate tectonics, Peninsular India was part of 
Gondwana about 200 million years ago. It drifted away from Gondwana and then collided 
with the Eurasian plate about 30-40 million years ago. An exchange of biota between 
Peninsular India and Asia resulted from the collision. A molecular study suggests that the 
gastropods of Southeast Asia migrated to southern India (Datta-Roy and Karanth, 2009: 688). 
To take another example, arowanas are freshwater fish that are intolerant of salty water. They, 
however, inhabit Southeast Asia and Australasia. How could they live in these different 
continents separated by salt water? The paleogeographical information and molecular data 
suggest that their common ancestors lived in Gondwana, and that the ancestors of Asian 
arowanas were transported northward by the Indian subcontinent, which had been part of 
Gondwana but moved to Asia (Kumazawa and Nishida, 2000). 
Molecular biology and electromagnetic theory jointly explain why our skin develops 
cancer when over-exposed to sunshine (Trefil and Hazen, 1998: 155–156). The wavelengths 
of ultraviolet light are smaller than those of infrared and visible light. So ultraviolet light 
carries more energy than infrared and visible light. Skin cancer occurs when ultraviolet light, 
which is more powerful than infrared and visible light, destroys DNA molecules in our skin. 
Note that concepts from molecular biology and electromagnetic theory are jointly invoked to 
explain why skin cancer occurs. 
Electromagnetic theory, the germ theory, and molecular biology jointly explain how 
daily objects, such as kitchen utensils, computer keyboards, and mobile phones, are sanitized. 
There are invisible germs on the surfaces of daily objects. They can be killed by ultraviolet 
light. Ultraviolet light can penetrate their cell membranes and damage their DNA. Such a 
method to destroy microorganisms is called ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (Kowalski, 
2009). It has been an accepted method of disinfection since the mid-twentieth century. If a 
kitchen utensil is sanitized using this method, that can be explained with the use of 
electromagnetic theory, the germ theory, and molecular biology. 
 
4. The Argument from Neighboring Theories 
In this section, I unfold the philosophical implications of the fact that evolutionary theory 
explains or predicts diverse new phenomena in cooperation with its neighboring theories. 
Michael Friedman observes that atomic theory and the hypothesis of molecular 
constitution jointly “explain chemical bonding, thermal and electrical conduction, nuclear 
energy, genetic inheritance, and literally hundreds of other phenomena” (1981: 7). He 
emphasizes that atomic theory and the hypothesis have become more likely to be true as a 
result of jointly explaining new phenomena. His insight can be captured by the concept of 
coherence (Park, 2011a: 23–24). To say that T1 coheres with T2 means that they support each 
other to some extent. 
Evolutionary theory and its neighboring theories cohere with each other as a result of 
jointly explaining new phenomena. Evolutionary theory raises, to some extent, the 
probability that the theory of plate tectonics is true, and vice versa. Though evolutionary 
theory might not have enough epistemic force to show that the theory of plate tectonics is 
likely to be true, and vice versa, they both become more likely to be true as a result of 
cohering with each other. They are more than merely consistent with each other. Consistency 
means only that they do not contradict each other. The idea that scientific theories can cohere 
with one another goes well with Carl Hempel’s observation that a scientific theory can 
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receive support from other scientific theories (Hempel, 1966: 38–39). 
T1 and T2 can directly and/or indirectly cohere with each other (Park, 2011a: 25). The 
theory of evolution and the theory of plate tectonics directly cohere since they jointly explain 
the fossils of marsupials in Antarctica. The theory of plate tectonics and electromagnetic 
theory directly cohere since they jointly explain magnetic stripes on ocean floors. It follows 
that evolutionary theory indirectly coheres with electromagnetic theory, i.e., that they cohere 
with each other via the intermediate theory, viz., the theory of plate tectonics. Evolutionary 
theory and electromagnetic theory, however, also directly cohere with each other since they 
jointly explain different skin pigmentations. Thus, they cohere with each other not only 
directly but also indirectly. 
In the previous section, we observed that evolutionary theory directly coheres with its 
several neighboring theories. The neighboring theories constitute the following list:  
 
List of Neighboring Theories 
- the theory of plate tectonics 
- molecular biology 
- electromagnetic theory 
- the germ theory 
 
These theories were all previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and then they 
cohered with evolutionary theory. So they might be retrospectively called unconceived 
neighboring theories. The concept of an unconceived neighboring theory differs from that of 
an unconceived alternative developed by Stanford (2006). By ‘an unconceived alternative,’ 
Stanford means a rival theory that would supplant an accepted theory. For example, the 
oxygen theory was an unconceived alternative to the phlogiston theory. By ‘a neighboring 
theory,’ however, I do not mean a rival or an alternative to an accepted theory. I rather mean a 
theory in a neighboring field of science.  
Let me flesh out the argument from neighboring theories mentioned earlier. The fact 
that evolutionary theory coheres with its several neighboring theories, which had been 
previously unconceived, makes it likely that there are more neighboring theories, presently 
unconceived, that will cohere with evolutionary theory. The more that such theories are 
produced, the greater the inductive rationale will become for the conclusion that there will be 
even more such theories. It probably follows that there are infinitely many such theories. It is 
not merely possible but likely that they exist. In short, since evolutionary theory coheres with 
its several neighboring theories, it will cohere with infinitely many neighboring theories.  
The argument from neighboring theories is intended to justify evolutionary theory but 
not other scientific theories. So if scientific antirealists want to refute the argument from 
neighboring theories, they should provide neighboring theories that were previously 
unconceived, but that were later conceived and then clashed with evolutionary theory. If the 
number of such theories is greater than that of theories that were unconceived, but that were 
later conceived, and then cohered with evolutionary theory, the argument from neighboring 
theories would be defeated.1 
We have good reason for thinking that we cannot find neighboring theories that clashed 
                                           
1 What matters is not only the number of neighboring theories but also the degrees to which they are supported. 
The probability of evolutionary theory goes up, although it clashes with two moderately supported neighboring 
theories, if it coheres with one extremely well-supported neighboring theory. I thank the first referee for making 
this point. 
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with evolutionary theory before the twentieth century. Up until the end of the nineteenth 
century, high walls separated the different fields of science (Park, 2011b: 80–89). For 
example, biologists and chemists did not communicate with one another until the end of the 
nineteenth century when Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) persuaded medical doctors that some 
diseases could be chemically understood. To take another example, geologists and physicists 
did not communicate with one another until the end of the nineteenth century, when 
geologists began to use the radioactive method to determine the age of various materials and 
to set up hypotheses about distant past events. So it is unlikely that evolutionary theory has 
ever clashed with a neighboring theory. 
One might object that evolutionary theory conflicts with the kinetic theory. 
Evolutionary theory claims that organisms have evolved from simple to complex forms, 
which implies that the entropy of Earth has been decreasing. The second law of 
thermodynamics, however, claims that entropy tends to increase. Thus, evolutionary theory 
would seem to clash with the kinetic theory.  
This objection, however, rests upon a misunderstanding of the second law of 
thermodynamics. The second law of thermodynamics does not assert that the entropy of just 
any system tends to increase. It rather asserts that the entropy of a closed system tends to 
increase. Consequently, it is compatible with the fact that the entropy of an open system 
decreases. Earth is an open system in that it receives energy from the Sun. Thus, on close 
examination, evolutionary theory is consistent with the kinetic theory. 
Scientific antirealists might argue that we cannot conceive of infinitely many 
neighboring theories that will cohere with evolutionary theory, so they do not exist. An 
obvious reply to this objection, however, is that we have the aforementioned inductive 
rationale for the view that they exist. Moreover, the fact that we cannot conceive of them 
shows not that they do not exist, but rather that we are not more intelligent than earlier 
scientists who could not conceive of infinitely many neighboring theories that were fated to 
cohere with evolutionary theory. 
The argument from neighboring theories mirrors the PUA. Just as Stanford contends 
that the possibility space of alternatives is inhabited by infinitely many hitherto unconceived 
theories of disease on the grounds that there have been three theories of disease, so I contend 
that the possibility space of neighboring theories is inhabited by infinitely many hitherto 
unconceived neighboring theories that will cohere with evolutionary theory on the grounds 
that several previously unconceived neighboring theories now cohere with evolutionary 
theory. Just as Stanford claims that the inability of present scientists to think up infinitely 
many alternatives only indicates that they are cognitively similar to earlier scientists who 
could not think up infinitely many alternatives, so I claim that the inability of present 
scientists to think up infinitely many theories that will cohere with evolutionary theory only 
indicates that they are cognitively similar to earlier scientists who could not think up 
infinitely many neighboring theories that would cohere with evolutionary theory. 
Accordingly, the argument from neighboring theories and the PUA stand or fall together. 
The argument from neighboring theories also echoes the argument for special relativity 
(Park, 2018a: 59). It holds that special relativity has been strengthened by several methods 
that were previously unconceived, such as fast-moving jets, the global positioning system, 
atomic clocks, and particle accelerators. It probably follows that it will be strengthened by 
infinitely many hitherto unconceived methods. We are warranted in believing now that it is 
true, even if its present observational evidence endows it with only 1% probability, given that 
its probability is fated to go above 99%. The argument from neighboring theories has a 
similar effect on the probability of evolutionary theory. 
The foregoing argument for special relativity is similar to the PUA in that the former 
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makes an inference to infinitely many unconceived methods, and that the latter makes an 
inference to infinitely many theories. The argument for special relativity is also similar to K. 
Brad Wray’s argument from unconceived methods, which holds that “some of the changes of 
theory in the past have been due to changes in methodology, and some of the changes of 
theory in the future will also likely be due to changes in methodology” (Wray, 2016: 372–
373). Note that the two arguments commonly make inferences to the existence of 
unconceived methods. In sum, the argument for special relativity utilizes ironically the two 
ideas that the two eminent pessimists have developed to argue against scientific realism. 
The argument from neighboring theories and the no-miracles argument for scientific 
realism (Putnam, 1975: 73) exemplify different rules of inference. The no-miracles argument 
exemplifies abduction, asserting that the success of science would be a miracle, if successful 
theories were false, and thus, they are successful because they are true. By contrast, the 
argument from neighboring theories exemplifies enumerative induction, saying that since 
evolutionary theory is bolstered by its several neighboring theories, it will be bolstered by 
infinitely many neighboring theories. Scientific pessimists are not skeptics about enumerative 
induction – after all, if they were skeptics about enumerative induction, it would be self-
defeating for them to run the PUA against present scientific theories. Consequently, they 
should accept the argument from neighboring theories. 
The argument from neighboring theories fits well with a current research trend in 
science. Scientists these days are encouraged to engage in interdisciplinary research. The idea 
behind interdisciplinary research seems to be that scientists in different fields can discover 
more about the world by sharing their research achievements with one another than by going 
deeper into their own fields without communicating with one another. This recent research 
trend in science makes it obsolete for philosophers of science to evaluate a scientific theory in 
isolation from its neighboring scientific theories. Stanford’s PUA overlooks the fact that 
some present theories cohere with their neighboring theories.  
The same criticism applies to Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1970) philosophy of science. 
Kuhn made many interesting claims about how successive theories in a field of science are 
related to one another. For example, he claimed that the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories 
were incommensurable. But he did not make any claim about how a theory is related to its 
neighboring theories. That is not surprising, given that he was a history-oriented philosopher 
of science. He used examples from past science, such as the Ptolemaic theory, the phlogiston 
theory, and the caloric theory, to construct his philosophy of science. Those theories were 
accepted and rejected before the twentieth century, and as we have seen earlier, scientists 
belonging to different fields did not communicate with one another until the end of the 
nineteenth century. So there was no chance for past theories to cohere with their neighboring 
theories. 
By contrast, the argument from neighboring theories uses examples from present 
science, such as the theory of plate tectonics and evolutionary theory, and exhibits their 
shared property, viz., coherence. It is inadequate to say that neighboring theories are 
incommensurable. Biologists and geologists share observational data, although they belong to 
different paradigms. After all, they cooperate with one another to explain new phenomena. 
Moreover, they have no problem communicating with one another, given that they are 
engaged in interdisciplinary research, citing one another’s papers. In any event, if we are 
informed of how neighboring theories are related to one another, we will have a better picture 
of science. 
The argument from neighboring theories goes hand in hand with the pessimistic 
induction over pessimists (Park, 2017a: 612). What does the pessimistic induction over 
pessimists say? Imagine that pessimists in the early twentieth century predicted that their 
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accepted theories, such as the germ theory, special relativity, evolutionary theory, and 
electromagnetic theory, would be overthrown, just as their earlier theories, such as the ether 
theory, the miasma theory, the caloric theory, the phlogiston theory, and the Ptolemaic theory, 
had been overthrown. They were wrong about their accepted theories. It follows that present 
and future pessimists are and will be also wrong about their accepted theories. In short, both 
the pessimistic induction over pessimists and the argument from neighboring theories 
recommend the realist attitude toward evolutionary theory.  
The argument from neighboring theories undercuts not only pessimism but also 
selectivism. Selectivists observe that working posits of past theories were retained, but their 
idle posits were discarded (Worrall, 1989; Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999; Chakravartty, 2008; 
Enfield, 2008; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; Harker, 2008; Psillos, 2009; Saatsi, 2009; Ruhmkorff, 
2011: 882; Vickers, 2017; Psillos, 2018). On the basis of this observation of past theories, 
selectivists predict that working posits of present theories will survive scientific revolutions, 
though their idle posits will not. This prediction implies that present theories, including 
evolutionary theory, will be superseded by future theories (Park, 2017b: 98–99, 2017c: 65, 
2018a: 60–61, 2018b: Section 3, 2018c: 337; Stanford, 2018: 79). The argument from 
neighboring theories, however, asserts that evolutionary theory will only be justified by 
infinitely many neighboring theories. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
5.1. Not More Probable 
Pessimists would reject Friedman’s contention that two hypotheses become more probable if 
they jointly explain new phenomena, and hence they would also reject my contention that 
evolutionary theory and its neighboring theories support one another to some extent, i.e., that 
they cohere with one another. They would insist that the probability of evolutionary theory 
remains unchanged even if it jointly explains new phenomena along with its neighboring 
theories, e.g., even if it, in conjunction with the theory of plate tectonics, makes a true 
prediction about the existence of marsupial fossils in Antarctica. 
My response to this objection is to point out that pessimists are not skeptics about 
induction. After all, they make an inductive inference from the downfall of past theories to 
that of present theories. Skeptics about induction would not predict anything from the 
downfall of past theories. It would be interesting to see what argument pessimists can come 
up with to show that the joint prediction of the theory of plate tectonics and evolutionary 
theory does not raise the probabilities of the two theories at all, but that because the caloric 
theory was overturned, it is likely that the kinetic theory will be overturned. 
 
5.2. Finitely Many Theories 
Pessimists might now contend that the existence of several successive theories in a domain 
justifies the conclusion that there are finitely many successive theories, but not the conclusion 
that there are infinitely many successive alternatives in the domain. As a result, they might 
modify the PUA as asserting that there are finitely many alternatives. This new version, 
although less ambitious than the old version, has sufficient force to show that presently 
accepted theories will be overturned, and yet does not make an (illegitimate) inference to 
infinity. So it stands while the argument from neighboring theories falls. 
On close examination, however, the new version of the PUA does not have enough 
power to show that current theories will be rejected. Of course, it is possible that scientists 
have not yet discarded enough false theories before they reach true theories, and that 
consequently, current theories will be discarded. It is, however, also possible that scientists 
have already discarded enough false theories before they reach true theories, and that 
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consequently, current theories will not be discarded. As Samuel Ruhmkorff observes, “as 
long as there is a finite number of theories in a domain, the falsity of past theories will tend to 
increase rather than decrease our confidence in current theory” (Ruhmkorff, 2013: 412).  
Suppose that five alternatives exist in the possibility space of theories of disease. In this 
case, the germ theory is false, and scientists need to oust more false theories before they 
reach the true theory of disease. Suppose, however, that there are only three theories in the 
possibility space. In this case, the germ theory is true, and scientists have already reached the 
true theory. The mere historical fact that scientists have eliminated the two theories of disease 
does not give us any clue as to which probability is higher. So pessimists have the burden of 
showing that “the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives 
is higher than the probability that scientists have eliminated enough false alternatives” (Park, 
2019: Section 3.1). No pessimist, however, has yet provided an argument to show that the 
former probability is higher than the latter probability. 
It is for this reason that pessimists should claim that infinitely many alternatives exist. 
If infinitely many alternatives exist, pessimists do not have the burden of showing that it is 
more likely that scientists have not yet ousted enough false theories, for scientists will never 
be able to eliminate enough false alternatives. To contend, however, that infinitely many 
alternatives exist is to open the door to the argument from neighboring theories. 
My foregoing response to Stanford’s inference to an infinite number of alternatives 
differs from that of Ruhmkorff (2013). Ruhmkorff claims that there “may be chunks of 
possibility space that are very implausible” (2013: 412). The possible existence of such 
chunks opens the possibility that “only 10 of the infinitely many unconceived alternatives are 
plausible while the others are widely implausible” (Ruhmkorff, 2013: 412). 
However, it is not enough to merely point out that only ten of them might be plausible. 
After all, this possibility is cancelled out by the opposite possibility that ten of them are 
implausible and the rest of them are plausible. Moreover, Ruhmkorff’s position contrasts with 
Stanford’s position. Ruhmkorff does not attempt to support his position, whereas Stanford 
does, i.e., he provides the list of past theories cited in Section 2. 
 
5.3. Why Stronger? 
Pessimists might argue that when we consider whether we should believe in evolutionary 
theory, we should weigh the PUA against the argument from neighboring theories. The 
former claims that there are infinitely many alternatives to evolutionary theory, while the 
latter claims that there are infinitely many neighboring theories that cohere with evolutionary 
theory. What is the reason for thinking that the argument from neighboring theories is 
stronger than the PUA? 
The reason can be found in the comparison between Stanford’s list in Section 2 and the 
list of neighboring theories in Section 3. According to Stanford’s list, there were three 
theories of evolution: Cuvier’s theory, Lamarck’s autogenesis, and Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory. According to the list of neighboring theories, however, evolutionary theory directly 
coheres with five neighboring theories. Moreover, the neighboring theories are more 
successful than Cuvier’s theory and Lamarck’s theory, given that “present theories are more 
successful than past theories” (Park, 2018d: 8). This observation has already been made by 
many writers (Musgrave, 1985; Leplin, 1997; Doppelt, 2007; Doppelt, 2011; Saatsi, 2009; 
Devitt, 2011; Fahrbach, 2011a; Fahrbach, 2011b; Park, 2011b; Mizrahi, 2013; Doppelt, 
2014). It follows that the inductive force of the argument from neighboring theories is greater 
than that of the PUA. 
Similar arguments can be constructed in favor of the neighboring theories of 
evolutionary theory. For example, the germ theory has two predecessors: the humoral and 
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miasma theories. But it directly and/or indirectly coheres with its neighboring theories, such 
as evolutionary theory, electromagnetic theory, molecular biology, and the theory of plate 
tectonics. Moreover, its neighboring theories are more successful than its predecessors. Thus, 
the germ theory is more likely to be reinforced by its neighboring theories than to be 
overthrown by an alternative.  
 
5.4. Huntington’s Disease 
Critics might object that the example of Huntington’s disease differs from the other 
examples.2 In the example of Huntington’s disease, the explanation proffered only answers an 
explanatory question for evolutionary theory. This kind of explanation seems different from 
the others in that it merely answers an objection to evolutionary theory and does not explain 
new phenomena in conjunction with its neighboring theory. 
In my view, there is no relevant difference between the example of Huntington’s 
disease and the other examples, such as the example of skin pigmentations. Evolutionary 
theory was not originally designed to explain the way in which people of different 
pigmentations are distributed around the world. It, however, explains the phenomenon in 
cooperation with electromagnetic theory. Similarly, evolutionary theory was not originally 
designed to explain why some people suffer from Huntington’s disease. Evolutionary theory 
explains the phenomenon in conjunction with molecular biology. In both cases, the existence 
of an explanandum is a new challenge to evolutionary theory, and evolutionary theory meets 
the new challenge with the help of its neighboring theories. 
 
5.5. Finitely Many Theories Again 
I argued in Section 4 that there are infinitely many neighboring theories. Pessimists might 
object that it is not necessary for realists to appeal to infinitely many neighboring theories.3 
Realists only need finitely many neighboring theories. Evolutionary theory is warranted if it 
coheres with, say, 500,000 neighboring theories. Similarly, pessimists only need finitely 
many alternatives. A present theory is unwarranted if there are, say, 500,000 alternatives to it. 
Retreating to finitely many theories comes with costs for both realists and pessimists. If 
realists say that there are finitely many neighboring theories, they should give up the previous 
claim that the probability of evolutionary theory is fated to go above 99%. If pessimists say 
that there are finitely many successive alternatives, they should show that scientists have not 
yet ousted enough false theories.  
Moreover, the PUA is built upon the assumption that the “more theories were replaced 
by unconceived alternatives, the more likely it is that present theories will be superseded by 
unconceived alternatives” (Park, 2016: 838). It implies that the more that accepted theories 
are replaced by alternatives, the greater the inductive rationale becomes for concluding that 
such alternatives exist. Suppose that we have 500 discarded theories, and that our scientific 
offspring will have 500,000 discarded theories. Obviously, our scientific offspring’s inductive 
rationale is stronger than our inductive rationale. Thus, the inductive rationale for the 
existence of alternatives will only grow stronger, and we have no choice but to conclude that 
infinitely many alternatives exist. By parity of reasoning, I suggest, the inductive rationale for 
the existence of neighboring theories will only grow stronger. Thus, we have no choice but to 
conclude that infinitely many neighboring theories exist. 
                                           
2 I thank the first referee for this objection. 
3 I thank the first referee for this objection. 
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5.6. The Conflict with Neighboring Theories 
Objectors might say that I have not adequately supported the contention that there are 
infinitely many neighboring theories to cohere with evolutionary theory.4  From the fact that 
several once unconceived theories were eventually conceived and then supported 
evolutionary theory, it does not follow that the majority of currently unconceived ones will 
also be conceived and support evolutionary theory. It might be that they will rather conflict 
with evolutionary theory. 
There should, however, be an inductive rationale for thinking so. It is not enough to 
merely point out that the majority of unconceived neighboring theories might conflict with 
evolutionary theory. After all, this possibility is cancelled out by the opposite possibility that 
the majority of unconceived neighboring theories cohere with evolutionary theory. Moreover, 
the objectors’ position contrasts with my position. I have the list of the four neighboring 
theories that I claim support my position, whereas the objectors do not have a list of 
neighboring theories that would support their position. The prospect of such a list is dim, as I 
have already argued in Section 3. 
 
5.7. General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics 
Objectors might now say that this paper overlooks the case of inconsistency between general 
relativity and quantum mechanics. 5  The inconsistency between these two fundamental 
physical theories makes scientific realism untenable. 
I already preempted such an objection in Section 3. Recall that the argument from 
neighboring theories for evolutionary theory is intended to justify evolutionary theory but not 
other scientific theories. So if scientific antirealists want to refute the argument from 
neighboring theories for evolutionary theory, they should provide a list of neighboring 
theories that clash with evolutionary theory. It is a red herring to talk about the inconsistency 
between general relativity and quantum mechanics in the context of talking about 
evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory claims, for example, that all current species on 
Earth have evolved from a common ancestor. The epistemic status of this claim is 
independent of the issue of whether spacetime is continuous or granular. It is a fallacious 
inference that since we do not know whether spacetime is continuous or granular, we do not 
know whether all current species on Earth have evolved from a common ancestor. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how much threat the inconsistency between the two physical 
theories poses to scientific realism, as Park (2015: 223, 2018b: Section 5) argues. 
 
5.8. Individuating Theories 
Finally, pessimists might object that it is not clear how we can individuate theories, i.e., what 
criteria can be deployed to draw the boundaries between theories. For example, it is not clear 
what entitles us to say that evolutionary theory and molecular biology are different theories. 
It follows that it is not clear how many neighboring theories evolutionary theory directly 
coheres with, although I claimed in Section 3 that it coheres with four neighboring theories, 
including molecular biology. 
This objection is reasonable and should be addressed by all participants in the scientific 
realism debate, including pessimists. Larry Laudan, for example, contends that “for every 
                                           
4 I thank the second referee for this objection. 
5 I thank the second referee for this objection. 
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highly successful theory in the past of science which we now believe to be a genuinely 
referring theory, one could find half a dozen once successful theories which we now regard as 
substantially non-referring” (1981: 35). Such a gloomy portrayal of past science is necessary 
for the pessimistic induction to get off the ground. The gloomy portrayal, however, 
presupposes that there are criteria for individuating past theories. Unfortunately, no 
philosopher has yet provided such criteria. So we have an interesting problem that every 
participant in the realism debate should address. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The argument from neighboring theories holds that since evolutionary theory coheres with its 
several neighboring theories, it will cohere with infinitely many neighboring theories. This 
argument for evolutionary theory is different from the no-miracles argument for evolutionary 
theory, which says that the truth of it best explains its success. In addition, the argument from 
neighboring theories reflects the PUA, but it is stronger than the PUA. Let me sum up this 
paper in a simple slogan: Neighboring theories are realists’ friends. 
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